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Inside Aztec

Inside
Aztec

purple_2
Aztec Network
28 Oct
xx min read

Your Favorite DeFi Apps, Now With Privacy

How Aztec is Adding Privacy to Apps Across the Ethereum Ecosystem

Every time you swap tokens on Uniswap, deposit into a yield vault, or vote in a DAO, you're broadcasting your moves to the world. Anyone can see what you own, where you trade, how much you invest, and when you move your money.

Tracking and analysis tools like Chainalysis and TRM are already extremely advanced, and will only grow stronger with advances in AI in the coming years. The implications of this are that the ‘pseudo-anonymous’ wallets on Ethereum are quickly becoming linked to real-world identities. This is concerning for protecting your personal privacy, but it’s also a major blocker in bringing institutions on-chain with full compliance for their users. 

Until now, your only option was to abandon your favorite apps and move to specialized privacy-focused apps or chains with varying degrees of privacy. You'd lose access to the DeFi ecosystem as you know it now, the liquidity you depend on, and the community you're part of. 

What if you could keep using Uniswap, Aave, Yearn, and every other app you love, but with your identity staying private? No switching chains. Just an incognito mode for your existing on-chain life? 

If you’ve been following Aztec for a while, you would be right to think about Aztec Connect here, which was hugely popular with $17M TVL and over 100,000 active wallets, but was sunset in 2024 to focus on bringing a general-purpose privacy network to life. 

Read on to learn how you’ll be able to import privacy to any L2, using one of the many privacy-focused bridges that are already built. 

The Aztec Network  

Aztec is a fully decentralized, privacy-preserving L2 on Ethereum. You can think of Aztec as a private world computer with full end-to-end programmable privacy. A private world computer extends Ethereum to add optional privacy at every level, from identity and transactions to the smart contracts themselves. 

On Aztec, every wallet is a smart contract that gives users complete control over which aspects they want to make public or keep private. 

Aztec is currently in Testnet, but will have multiple privacy-preserving bridges live for its mainnet launch, unlocking a myriad of privacy preserving features.

Bringing Privacy to You

Now, several bridges, including Wormhole, TRAIN, and Substance, are connecting Aztec to other chains, adding a privacy layer to the L2s you already use. Think of it as a secure tunnel between you and any DeFi app on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, or other major chains.

Here's what changes: You can now use any DeFi protocol without revealing your identity. Furthermore, you can also unlock brand new features that take advantage of Aztec’s private smart contracts, like private DAO voting or private compliance checks. 

Here's what you can do:

  • Use DeFi without revealing your portfolio: trade on Uniswap or deposit into Yearn without broadcasting your strategy to the world
  • Donate to causes without being tracked: support projects on Base without linking donations to your identity
  • Vote in DAOs without others seeing your choices: participate in governance on Arbitrum while keeping your votes private
  • Prove you're legitimate without doxxing yourself: pass compliance checks or prove asset ownership without revealing which specific assets you hold
  • Access exclusive perks without revealing which NFTs you own: unlock token-gated content on Optimism without showing your entire collection

The apps stay where they are. Your liquidity stays where it is. Your community stays where it is. You just get a privacy upgrade.

How It Actually Works 

Let's follow Alice through a real example.

Alice wants to invest $1,000 USDC into a yield vault on Arbitrum without revealing her identity. 

Step 1: Alice Sends Funds Through Aztec

Alice moves her funds into Aztec's privacy layer. This could be done in one click directly in the app that she’s already using if the app has integrated one of the bridges. Think of this like dropping a sealed envelope into a secure mailbox. The funds enter a private space where transactions can't be tracked back to her wallet.

Step 2: The Funds Arrive at the DeFi Vault

Aztec routes Alice's funds to the Yearn vault on Arbitrum. The vault sees a deposit and issues yield-earning tokens. But there's no way to trace those tokens back to Alice's original wallet. Others can see someone made a deposit, but they have no idea who.

Step 3: Alice Gets Her Tokens Back Privately

The yield tokens arrive in Alice's private Aztec wallet. She can hold them, trade them privately, or eventually withdraw them, without anyone connecting the dots.

Step 4: Alice Earns Yield With Complete Privacy

Alice is earning yield on Arbitrum using the exact same vault as everyone else. But while other users broadcast their entire investment strategy, Alice's moves remain private. 

The difference looks like this:

Without privacy: "Wallet 0x742d...89ab deposited $5,000 into Yearn vault at 2:47 PM"

With Aztec privacy: "Someone deposited funds into Yearn vault" (but who? from where? how much? unknowable).

In the future, we expect apps to directly integrate Aztec, making this experience seamless for you as a user. 

The Developers Behind the Bridges 

While Aztec is still in Testnet, multiple teams are already building bridges right now in preparation for the mainnet launch.

Projects like Substance Labs, Train, and Wormhole are creating connections between Aztec and major chains like Optimism, Unichain, Solana, and Aptos. This means you'll soon have private access to DeFi across nearly every major ecosystem.

Aztec has also launched a dedicated cross-chain catalyst program to support developers with grants to build additional bridges and apps. 

Unifying Liquidity Across Ethereum L2s

L2s have sometimes received criticism for fragmenting liquidity across chains. Aztec is taking a different approach. Instead, Aztec is bringing privacy to the liquidity that already exists. Your funds stay on Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, wherever the deepest pools and best apps already live. Aztec doesn't compete for liquidity, it adds privacy to existing liquidity.

You can access Uniswap's billions in trading volume. You can tap into Aave's massive lending pools. You can deposit into Yearn's established vaults, all without moving liquidity away from where it's most useful.

The Future of Private DeFi

We’re rolling out a new approach to how we think about L2s on Ethereum. Rather than forcing users to choose between privacy and access to the best DeFi applications, we’re making privacy a feature you can add to any protocol you're already using. As more bridges go live and applications integrate Aztec directly, using DeFi privately will become as simple as clicking a button—no technical knowledge required, no compromise on the apps and liquidity you depend on.

While Aztec is currently in testnet, the infrastructure is rapidly taking shape. With multiple bridge providers building connections to major chains and a dedicated catalyst program supporting developers, the path to mainnet is clear. Soon, you'll be able to protect your privacy while still participating fully in the Ethereum ecosystem. 

If you’re a developer and want a full technical breakdown, check out this post. To stay up to date with the latest updates for network operators, join the Aztec Discord and follow Aztec on X.

Most Recent
Aztec Network
22 Oct
xx min read

Bringing Private Over-The-Counter (OTC) Swaps to Crypto

Transparent OTC Trades Are Holding the Industry Back

OTC trading is fundamental to how crypto markets function. It enables better price negotiations than what you'll find on public order books and facilitates trading of illiquid assets that barely exist on exchanges. Without OTC markets, institutional crypto trading would be nearly impossible. But here's the massive problem: every single OTC transaction leaves a permanent, public trace. 

Let's say you're a fund manager who needs to sell 1,000 BTC for USDC on Base. In a traditional OTC trade, your Bitcoin leaves your wallet and becomes visible to everyone on Bitcoin's blockchain. Through cross-chain settlement, USDC then arrives in your Base wallet, which is also visible to everyone on Base's blockchain. 

At this point, block explorers and analytics firms can connect these transactions through pattern analysis. As a result, your trading patterns, position sizes, and timing become public data, exposing your entire strategy.

This isn't just about privacy; transparent OTC creates serious operational and strategic risks. These same concerns have moved a significant portion of traditional markets to private off-exchange trades. 

Why Traditional Finance Moved to Private Markets

In TradFi, institutions don't execute large trades on public order books for many reasons. In fact, ~13% of all stocks in the US are now traded in dark pools, and more than 50% of trades are now off-exchange. 

They use private networks, dark pools, and OTC desks specifically because:

  • Strategy Protection: Your competitors can't front-run your moves
  • Better Execution: No market impact from revealing large positions
  • Regulatory Compliance: Meet reporting requirements without public disclosure
  • Operational Security: Protect proprietary trading algorithms and relationships

While OTC trading is already a major part of the crypto industry, without privacy, true institutional participation will never be practical. 

Now, Aztec is making this possible. 

Moving Whale-Sized Bags Privately on Aztec

We built an open-source private OTC trading system using Aztec Network's programmable privacy features. Because Aztec allows users to have private, programmable, and composable private state, users aren’t limited to only owning and transferring digital assets privately, but also programming and composing them via smart contracts.

If you’re new to Aztec, you can think of the network as a private world computer, with full end-to-end programmable privacy. A private world computer extends Ethereum to add optional privacy at every level, from identity and transactions to the smart contracts themselves. 

To build a private OTC desk, we leveraged all these tools provided by Aztec to implement a working proof of concept. Our private OTC desk is non-custodial and leverages private smart contracts and client-side proving to allow for complete privacy of the seller and buyer of the OTC.

How It Actually Works

For Sellers:

  1. Deploy a private escrow contract (only you know it exists at this stage)
  2. Initialize contract and set the terms (asset type, quantity, price)
  3. Deposit your assets into the contract
  4. After it’s been deployed, call a private API (the order book service)

For Buyers:

  1. Discover available orders through our privacy-preserving API
  2. Select trades that match your criteria
  3. Complete the seller's partial note with your payment
  4. Execute atomic swap – you get their assets, they get your payment

The Magic: Partial Notes are the technical breakthrough that make collaborative, asynchronous private transactions possible. Sellers create incomplete payment commitments that buyers can finish without revealing the seller's identity. It's like leaving a blank check that only the right person can cash, but neither party knows who the other is.

Privacy guarantees include: 

  • Complete Privacy: Neither party knows who they're trading with
  • Strategy Protection: Your trading patterns stay private
  • Market Impact Minimization: No public signals about large movements
  • Non-custodial: Direct peer-to-peer settlement, no intermediaries

Key Innovations

Private Contract Deployment: Unlike public decentralized exchanges where smart contracts are visible on the blockchain, the escrow contracts in this system are deployed privately, meaning that only the participants involved in the transaction know these contracts exist.

Partial Note Mechanism: This system uses cryptographic primitives that enable incomplete commitments to be finalized or completed by third parties, all while preventing those third parties from revealing or accessing any pre-existing information that was part of the original commitment.

Privacy-Preserving Discovery: The orderflow service maintains knowledge of aggregate trading volumes and overall market activity, but it cannot see the details of individual traders, including their specific trade parameters or personal identities.

Atomic Execution: The smart contract logic is designed to ensure that both sides of a trade occur simultaneously in a single atomic operation, meaning that if any part of the transaction fails, the entire transaction is rolled back and neither party's assets are transferred.

Build with us!

Our prototype for this is open-sourced here, and you can read about the proof of concept directly from the developer here

We're inviting teams to explore, fork, and commercialize this idea. The infrastructure for private institutional trading needs to exist, and Aztec makes it possible today. Whether you're building a private DEX, upgrading your OTC desk, or exploring new DeFi primitives, this codebase is your starting point. 

The traditional finance world conducts trillions in private OTC trades. It's time to bring that scale to crypto, privately.

To stay up to date with the latest updates for network operators, join the Aztec Discord and follow Aztec on X.

Aztec Network
15 Oct
xx min read

Your Private Money Yearns for a Private Economy

Watch this: Alice sends Zcash. Bob receives USDC on Aztec. Nobody, not even the system facilitating it, knows who Alice or Bob are.

And Bob can now do something with that money. Privately.

This is the connection between private money and a private economy where that money can actually be used.

Zcash has already achieved something monumental: truly private money. It’s the store of value that Bitcoin promised (but made transparent). Like, digital gold that actually stays hidden.

But here's the thing about gold - you don't buy coffee with gold bars. You need an economy where that value can flow, work, and grow. Privately.

Money Under the Mattress

While other projects are trying to bolt privacy onto existing chains as an afterthought, Zcash is one of the oldest privacy projects in Web3. It's achieved what dozens of projects are still chasing: a truly private store of value.

Total Shielded ZEC Value (USD): Sep 16 - Oct 14 | Source: zkp.baby/

This is critical infrastructure for freedom. The ability to store value privately is a fundamental right, a hedge against surveillance, and a given when using cash. We need a system that provides the same level of privacy guarantees as cash. Right now, there's over $1.1 billion sitting in Zcash's shielded pool, private wealth that's perfectly secure but essentially frozen.

Why frozen? Because the moment that shielded $ZEC tries to do anything beyond basic transfers: earn yield, get swapped for stablecoins, enter a liquidity pool, it must expose itself. The privacy in this format is destroyed.

This isn't Zcash's failure. They built exactly what they set out to build: the world's best private store of value. The failure is that the rest of crypto hasn't built where that value can actually work.

The Privacy Landscape Has an Imbalance

What happens when you want to do more than just send money? What happens when you want privacy after you transfer your money?

Private Digital Money (i.e., “Transfer Privacy,” largely solved by Zcash):

  • Zcash: est. 2016
  • Everyone else: building variants of digital money at the transaction or identity level
    • Monero
    • Ethereum privacy pools
    • 0xbow
    • Payy
    • Every privacy stablecoin project
    • Every confidential L2
    • Every privacy project you've ever heard of

Private World Computer (i.e., After-the-Transfer Privacy):

  • Aztec

Everyone else is competing to build better ways to hide money. Zcash has already built the private store of value, and Aztec has built the only way to use hidden money.

The Locked Liquidity Problem

Here's the trillion-dollar question: What good is private money if you can't use it?

Right now, Zcash's shielded pool contains billions in value. This is money in high-security vaults. But unlike gold in vaults that can be collateralized, borrowed against, or deployed, this private value just sits there.

Every $ZEC holder faces two impossible choices:

  1. Keep it shielded and forfeit all utility
  2. Unshield it to use it and forfeit all privacy

Our demo breaks this false sense of choice. For the first time, shielded value can move to a place where it remains private AND becomes useful.

The Private World Computer

Here's how you can identify whether you’re dealing with a private world computer, or just private digital money:

Without a private world computer (every other privacy solution):

  • Receive salary privately → Can't invest it
  • Store savings privately → Can't earn yield
  • Send money privately → Recipient can't use it privately

With a private world computer (only Aztec):

  • Receive salary privately → Invest it privately
  • Store savings privately → Earn APY privately
  • Send payment privately → Recipient spends it privately

This is basic financial common sense. Your money should grow. It should work. It should be useful.

The technical reality is that this requires private smart contracts. Aztec is building the only way to interact privately with smart contracts. These smart contracts themselves can remain completely hidden. Your private money can finally do what money is supposed to do: work for you.

What We Actually Built

Our demo proves these two worlds can connect:

  1. The Vault: Zcash
  2. The Engine: Aztec (where private money becomes useful)

We built the bridge between storing privately and doing privately.

The technical innovation - "partial notes" - are like temporary lockboxes that self-destruct after one use. Money can be put privately into these lockboxes, and a key can be privately handed to someone to unlock it. No one knows who put the money in, where the key came from, or who uses the key. You can read more about how they work here. But what matters isn't the mechanism. 

What matters is that Alice's Zcash can become Bob's working capital on Aztec without anyone knowing about either of them.

As a result, Bob receives USDC that he can:

  • Earn yield on
  • Trade with
  • Pay suppliers with
  • Build a business on
  • All privately

Why This Required Starting from Scratch (and 8 years of building)

You can't bolt privacy onto existing systems. You can't take Ethereum and make it private. You can't take a transparent smart contract platform and add privacy as a feature.

Aztec had to be built from the ground up as a private world computer because after-the-transfer privacy requires rethinking everything:

  • How state is managed
  • How contracts execute
  • How proofs are generated
  • How transactions are ordered

This is why there's only one name building fully private smart contracts. From the beginning, Aztec has been inspired by the work Zcash has done to create a private store of value. That’s what led to the vision for a private world computer.

Everyone else is iterating on the same transfer privacy problem. Aztec solves a fundamentally different problem.

The Obvious Future

Once you see it, you can't unsee it: Privacy without utility is only the first step.

Every privacy project will eventually need what Aztec built. Because their users will eventually ask: "Okay, my money is private... now what?"

  • Zcash users will want their $ZEC to earn yield
  • Privacy pool users will want to do more than just mix
  • Private stablecoin users will want to actually… use their stablecoins

This demo that connects Zcash to Aztec is the first connection between the old world (private transfers) and the new world (private everything else).

What This Means

For Zcash Holders: Your shielded $ZEC can finally do something without being exposed.

For Developers: Stop trying to build better mattresses to hide money under. Start building useful applications on the only platform that keeps them private. 

For the Industry: The privacy wars are over. There's transfer privacy (solved by Zcash) and after-the-transfer privacy (just Aztec).

What’s Next? 

This demo is live. The code is open source. The bridge between private money and useful private money exists.

But this is just the beginning. Every privacy project needs this bridge. Every private payment network needs somewhere for those payments to actually be used.

We're not competing with transfer privacy. We're continuing it.

Your private money yearns for the private economy.

Welcome to after-the-transfer privacy. Welcome to Aztec.

Aztec Network
8 Oct
xx min read

Aztec: The Private World Computer

Privacy has emerged as a major driver for the crypto industry in 2025. We’ve seen the explosion of Zcash, the Ethereum Foundation’s refocusing of PSE, and the launch of Aztec’s testnet with over 24,000 validators powering the network. Many apps have also emerged to bring private transactions to Ethereum and Solana in various ways, and exciting technologies like ZKPassport that privately bring identity on-chain using Noir have become some of the most talked about developments for ushering in the next big movements to the space. 

Underpinning all of these developments is the emerging consensus that without privacy, blockchains will struggle to gain real-world adoption. 

Without privacy, institutions can’t bring assets on-chain in a compliant way or conduct complex swaps and trades without revealing their strategies. Without privacy, DeFi remains dominated and controlled by advanced traders who can see all upcoming transactions and manipulate the market. Without privacy, regular people will not want to move their lives on-chain for the entire world to see every detail about their every move. 

While there's been lots of talk about privacy, few can define it. In this piece we’ll outline the three pillars of privacy and gives you a framework for evaluating the privacy claims of any project. 

The Three Pillars of Privacy 

True privacy rests on three essential pillars: transaction privacy, identity privacy, and computational privacy. It is only when we have all three pillars that we see the emergence of a private world computer. 

Transaction: What is being sent?

Transaction privacy means that both inputs and outputs are not viewable by anyone other than the intended participants. Inputs include any asset, value, message, or function calldata that is being sent. Outputs include any state changes or transaction effects, or any transaction metadata caused by the transaction. Transaction privacy is often primarily achieved using a UTXO model (like Zcash or Aztec’s private state tree). If a project has only the option for this pillar, it can be said to be confidential, but not private. 

Identity: Who is involved?

Identity privacy means that the identities of those involved are not viewable by anyone other than the intended participants. This includes addresses or accounts and any information about the identity of the participants, such as tx.origin, msg.sender, or linking one’s private account to public accounts. Identity privacy can be achieved in several ways, including client-side proof generation that keeps all user info on the users’ devices. If a project has only the option for this pillar, it can be said to be anonymous, but not private. 

Computation: What happened? 

Computation privacy means that any activity that happens is not viewable by anyone other than the intended participants. This includes the contract code itself, function execution, contract address, and full callstack privacy. Additionally, any metadata generated by the transaction is able to be appropriately obfuscated (such as transaction effects, events are appropriately padded, inclusion block number are in appropriate sets). Callstack privacy includes which contracts you call, what functions in those contracts you’ve called, what the results of those functions were, any subsequent functions that will be called after, and what the inputs to the function were. A project must have the option for this pillar to do anything privately other than basic transactions. 

From private money to a private world computer 

Bitcoin ushered in a new paradigm of digital money. As a permissionless, peer-to-peer currency and store of value, it changed the way value could be sent around the world and who could participate. Ethereum expanded this vision to bring us the world computer, a decentralized, general-purpose blockchain with programmable smart contracts. 

Given the limitations of running a transparent blockchain that exposes all user activity, accounts, and assets, it was clear that adding the option to preserve privacy would unlock many benefits (and more closely resemble real cash). But this was a very challenging problem. Zcash was one of the first to extend Bitcoin’s functionality with optional privacy, unlocking a new privacy-preserving UTXO model for transacting privately. As we’ll see below, many of the current privacy-focused projects are working on similar kinds of private digital money for Ethereum or other chains. 

Now, Aztec is bringing us the final missing piece: a private world computer.

A private world computer is fully decentralized, programmable, and permissionless like Ethereum and has optional privacy at every level. In other words, Aztec is extending all the functionality of Ethereum with optional transaction, identity, and computational privacy. This is the only approach that enables fully compliant, decentralized applications to be built that preserve user privacy, a new design space that we see as ushering in the next Renaissance for the space. 

Where are we now? 

Private digital money

Private digital money emerges when you have the first two privacy pillars covered - transactions and identity - but you don’t have the third - computation. Almost all projects today that claim some level of privacy are working on private digital money. This includes everything from privacy pools on Ethereum and L2s to newly emerging payment L1s like Tempo and Arc that are developing various degrees of transaction privacy 

When it comes to digital money, privacy exists on a spectrum. If your identity is hidden but your transactions are visible, that's what we call anonymous. If your transactions are hidden but your identity is known, that's confidential. And when both your identity and transactions are protected, that's true privacy. Projects are working on many different approaches to implement this, from PSE to Payy using Noir, the zkDSL built to make it intuitive to build zk applications using familiar Rust-like syntax. 

The Private World Computer 

Private digital money is designed to make payments private, but any interaction with more complex smart contracts than a straightforward payment transaction is fully exposed. 

What if we also want to build decentralized private apps using smart contracts (usually multiple that talk to each other)? For this, you need all three privacy pillars: transaction, identity, and compute. 

If you have these three pillars covered and you have decentralization, you have built a private world computer. Without decentralization, you are vulnerable to censorship, privileged backdoors and inevitable centralized control that can compromise privacy guarantees. 

Aztec: the Private World Computer 

What exactly is a private world computer? A private world computer extends all the functionality of Ethereum with optional privacy at every level, so developers can easily control which aspects they want public or private and users can selectively disclose information. With Aztec, developers can build apps with optional transaction, identity, and compute privacy on a fully decentralized network. Below, we’ll break down the main components of a private world computer.

Private Smart Contracts 

A private world computer is powered by private smart contracts. Private smart contracts have fully optional privacy and also enable seamless public and private function interaction. 

Private smart contracts simply extend the functionality of regular smart contracts with added privacy. 

As a developer, you can easily designate which functions you want to keep private and which you want to make public. For example, a voting app might allow users to privately cast votes and publicly display the result. Private smart contracts can also interact privately with other smart contracts, without needing to make it public which contracts have interacted. 

Aztec’s Three Pillars of Privacy

Transaction: Aztec supports the optionality for fully private inputs, including messages, state, and function calldata. Private state is updated via a private UTXO state tree.

Identity: Using client-side proofs and function execution, Aztec can optionally keep all user info private, including tx.origin and msg.sender for transactions. 

Computation: The contract code itself, function execution, and call stack can all be kept private. This includes which contracts you call, what functions in those contracts you’ve called, what the results of those functions were, and what the inputs to the function were. 

Decentralization

A decentralized network must be made up of a permissionless network of operators who run the network and decide on upgrades. Aztec is run by a decentralized network of node operators who propose and attest to transactions. Rollup proofs on Aztec are also run by a decentralized prover network that can permissionlessly submit proofs and participate in block rewards. Finally, the Aztec network is governed by the sequencers, who propose, signal, vote, and execute network upgrades.

What Can You Build with a Private World Computer?

Private DeFi

A private world computer enables the creation of DeFi applications where accounts, transactions, order books, and swaps remain private. Users can protect their trading strategies and positions from public view, preventing front-running and maintaining competitive advantages. Additionally, users can bridge privately into cross-chain DeFi applications, allowing them to participate in DeFi across multiple blockchains while keeping their identity private despite being on an existing transparent blockchain.

Private Dark Pools

This technology makes it possible to bring institutional trading activity on-chain while maintaining the privacy that traditional finance requires. Institutions can privately trade with other institutions globally, without having to touch public markets, enjoying the benefits of blockchain technology such as fast settlement and reduced counterparty risk, without exposing their trading intentions or volumes to the broader market.

Private RWAs & Stablecoins

Organizations can bring client accounts and assets on-chain while maintaining full compliance. This infrastructure protects on-chain asset trading and settlement strategies, ensuring that sophisticated financial operations remain private. A private world computer also supports private stablecoin issuance and redemption, allowing financial institutions to manage digital currency operations without revealing sensitive business information.

Compliant Apps

Users have granular control over their privacy settings, allowing them to fine-tune privacy levels for their on-chain identity according to their specific needs. The system enables selective disclosure of on-chain activity, meaning users can choose to reveal certain transactions or holdings to regulators, auditors, or business partners while keeping other information private, meeting compliance requirements.

Let’s build

The shift from transparent blockchains to privacy-preserving infrastructure is the foundation for bringing the next billion users on-chain. Whether you're a developer building the future of private DeFi, an institution exploring compliant on-chain solutions, or simply someone who believes privacy is a fundamental right, now is the time to get involved.

Follow Aztec on X to stay updated on the latest developments in private smart contracts and decentralized privacy technology. Ready to contribute to the network? Run a node and help power the private world computer. 

The next Renaissance is here, and it’s being powered by the private world computer.

Aztec Network
24 Sep
xx min read

Testnet Retro - 2.0.3 Network Upgrade

Special thanks to Santiago Palladino, Phil Windle, Alex Gherghisan, and Mitch Tracy for technical updates and review.

On September 17th, 2025, a new network upgrade was deployed, making Aztec more secure and flexible for home stakers. This upgrade, shipped with all the features needed for a fully decentralized network launch, includes a completely redesigned slashing system that allows inactive or malicious operators to be removed, and does not penalize home stakers for short outages. 

With over 23,000 operators running validators across 6 continents (in a variety of conditions), it is critical not to penalize nodes that temporarily drop due to internet connectivity issues. This is because users of the network are also found across the globe, some of whom might have older phones. A significant effort was put into shipping a low-memory proving mode that allows older mobile devices to send transactions and use privacy-preserving apps. 

The network was successfully deployed, and all active validators on the old testnet were added to the queue of the new testnet. This manual migration was only necessary because major upgrades to the governance contracts had gone in since the last testnet was deployed. The new testnet started producing blocks after the queue started to be “flushed,” moving validators into the rollup. Because the network is fully decentralized, the initial flush could have been called by anyone. The network produced ~2k blocks before an invalid block made it to the chain and temporarily stalled block production. Block production is now restored and the network is healthy. This post explains what caused the issue and provides an update on the current status of the network. 

Note: if you are a network operator, you must upgrade to version 2.0.3 and restart your node to participate in the latest testnet. If you want to run a node, it’s easy to get started.

What’s included in the upgrade? 

This upgrade was a team-wide effort that optimized performance and implemented all the mechanisms needed to launch Aztec as a fully decentralized network from day 1. 

Feature highlights include: 

  • Improved node stability: The Aztec node software is now far more stable. Users will see far fewer crashes and increased performance in terms of attestations and blocks produced. This translates into a far better experience using testnet, as transactions get included much faster.
  • Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) keys: When a validator registers on the rollup, they also provide keys that allow BLS signature aggregation. This unlocks future optimizations where signatures can be combined via p2p communication, then verified on Ethereum, while proving that the signatures come from block proposers.
  • Low-memory proving mode: The client-side proving requirements have dropped dramatically from 3.7GB to 1.3GB through a new low-memory proving mode, enabling older mobile devices to send Aztec transactions and use apps like zkPassport. 
  • AVM performance: The Aztec Virtual Machine (AVM) performance has seen major improvements with constraint coverage jumping from 0% to approximately 90-95%, providing far more secure AVM proving and more realistic proving performance numbers from provers. 
  • Flexible key management: The system now supports flexible key management through keystores, multi-EOA support, and remote signers, eliminating the need to pass private keys through environment variables and representing a significant step toward institutional readiness. 
  • Redesigned slashing: Slashing has been redesigned to provide much better consensus guarantees. Further, the new configuration allows nodes not to penalize home stakers for short outages, such as 20-minute interruptions. 
  • Slashing Vetoer: The Slasher contract now has an explicit vetoer: an address that can prevent slashing. At Mainnet, the initial vetoer will be operated by an independent group of security researchers who will also provide security assessments on upgrades. This acts as a failsafe in the event that nodes are erroneously trying to slash other nodes due to a bug.

With these updates in place, we’re ready to test a feature-complete network. 

What happened after deployment? 

As mentioned above, block production started when someone called the flush function and a minimum number of operators from the queue were let into the validator set. 

Shortly thereafter, while testing the network, a member of the Aztec Labs team spun up a “bad” sequencer that produced an invalid block proposal. Specifically, one of the state trees in the proposal was tampered with. 

Initial block production 

The expectation was that this would be detected immediately and the block rejected. Instead, a bug was discovered in the validator code where the invalid block proposal wasn't checked thoroughly enough. In effect, the proposal got enough attestations, so it was posted to the rollup. Due to extra checks in the nodes, when the nodes pulled the invalid block from Ethereum, they detected the tampered tree and refused to sync it. This is a good outcome as it prevented the attack. Additionally, prover nodes refused to prove the epoch containing the invalid block. This allowed the rollup to prune the entire bad epoch away. After the prune, the invalid state was reset to the last known good block.

Block production stalled

The prune revealed another, smaller bug, where, after a failed block sync, a prune does not get processed correctly, requiring a node restart to clear up. This led to a 90-minute outage from the moment the block proposal was posted until the testnet recovered. The time was equally split between waiting for pruning to happen and for the nodes to restart in order to process the prune.

The Fix

Validators were correctly re-executing all transactions in the block proposals and verifying that the world state root matched the one in the block proposal, but they failed to check that intermediate tree roots, which are included in the proposal and posted to the rollup contract on L1, were also correct. The attack tweaked one of these intermediate roots while proposing a correct world state root, so it went unnoticed by the attestors. 

As mentioned above, even though the block made it through the initial attestation and was posted to L1, the invalid block was caught by the validators, and the entire epoch was never proven as provers refused to generate a proof for the inconsistent state. 

A fix was pushed that resolved this issue and ensured that invalid block proposals would be caught and rejected. A second fix was pushed that ensures inconsistent state is removed from the uncommitted cache of the world state.

Block production restored

What’s Next

Block production is currently running smoothly, and the network health has been restored. 

Operators who had previously upgraded to version 2.0.3 will need to restart their nodes. Any operator who has not upgraded to 2.0.3 should do so immediately. 

Attestation and Block Production rate on the new rollup

Slashing has also been functioning as expected. Below you can see the slashing signals for each round. A single signal can contain votes for multiple validators, but a validator's attester needs to receive 65 votes to be slashed.

Votes on slashing signals

Join us this Thursday, September 25, 2025, at 4 PM CET on the Discord Town Hall to hear more about the 2.0.3 upgrade. To stay up to date with the latest updates for network operators, join the Aztec Discord and follow Aztec on X.

Explore by Topic
Aztec Network
Aztec Network
1 May
xx min read

A New Era for Web3: Introducing Aztec Public Testnet

When Aztec first got started, the world of zero-knowledge proving systems and applications was in its infancy. There was no PLONK, no Noir, no programmable privacy, and it wasn’t clear that demand for onchain privacy was even strong enough to necessitate a new blockchain network.

After a decade of building, revolutionary breakthroughs in privacy technology have paved the way to, and now set the stage for, mainnet including: PLONK, a novel proving system for user-level privacy and programmability that yielded zk.money and Aztec Connect, which was a pivotal moment for privacy and encryption solutions; Noir, an intuitive zero-knowledge, Rust-like programming language; and a client-side library for a private execution environment (PXE). These tools allow developers to explore privacy-preserving applications across any use case where protecting sensitive data is a critical function. 

In 2023 and 2024 Aztec was named by Electric Capital as one of the fastest-growing developer ecosystems. The next generation of applications on Ethereum are already being built using parts of the Aztec stack, like Noir. Projects such as zkPassport and zkEmail are unlocking key identity use cases, while other applications like Anoncast (built in one weekend) have caught the attention of heavyweights like Vitalik Buterin and Laura Shin.

Earlier this month, we announced the successful testing of the first decentralized upgrade process for an L2, with over 100 sequencers participating. Now, with the mission to bring programmable privacy to the masses, the Aztec Public Testnet is here and, for the first time ever, open to developers to build fully private applications on Ethereum. 

Click here to see the full product roadmap.

True privacy means full decentralization 

The Aztec Network will launch fully decentralized from day one. 

Not because it’s a flex, but because true privacy can only be achieved when there is no central entity that has potential backdoor access.

Imagine logging into your hot wallet using web2 auth with Google or iCloud, or proving you’re a U.S. citizen onchain without revealing your passport information. For this, you need onchain privacy, and true privacy needs full decentralization so the user can maintain control over their data. 

This is the vision for the Aztec Network. 

Like Zac, our CEO and Co-founder, said in his talk Privacy: The Missing Link, “there are three fundamental attributes required to bridge the gap and bring the world onchain: interfacing with web2 systems, linking accounts to identities, and establishing digital sovereignty.”

Launching a decentralized network is a complex task filled with lots of intricacies and nuances to navigate. The Aztec Public Testnet plays a crucial role in stress-testing the network, identifying early issues, and ensuring its participants work as intended – ultimately leading to a more robust mainnet. 

How do I participate in the Network?

There are two ways you can participate in the network: as a developer who wants to build and deploy applications (with end-to-end privacy) or as a node operator powering the network.

Developers 

Aztec enables developers to build with both private and public state. 

Smart contracts on Aztec blend private functions that execute on the client side with public functions that are executed by sequencers on the Aztec Network. This allows you to customize your contract with both public and private components while deploying them to a fully decentralized network. 

The fastest way to get started with the Aztec Public Testnet is to deploy a smart contract using the Playground. If you’re a developer, visit our dev landing page to connect to Testnet and deploy on the Aztec Network.

Node operators  

The Aztec Network is run by a decentralized sequencer and prover network. 

Sequencers propose and produce blocks using consumer hardware and are responsible for proposing and voting on network upgrades. Provers participate in a decentralized prover network and are selected to prove the rollup integrity.

No airdrops. No marketing gimmicks. We just want to create a community of highly skilled operators who share the vision of a fully decentralized privacy-preserving network. Anyone can boot up a sequencer node and access the testnet faucet. See the sequencer quickstart to get started. Apply to get a special Discord role and peer support from experienced node operators leading the Aztec Network. 

Start building   

To see existing applications and get inspo for what you want to build on the Aztec Public Testnet, check out our Ecosystem page. If you’ve already built an app and would like to be featured, submit your app here.

Next, head to the Playground to try out the Aztec Public Testnet, where you can deploy and interact with privacy-preserving smart contracts. Tools and infrastructure to start building wallets, bridges, and explorers are already available.

If you’re a developer, click ➡️ here to get started and deploy your smart contract in literal minutes. 

If you’re a node operator, click ➡️ here to set up and run a node. 

Stay up-to-date on Noir and Aztec by following Noir and Aztec on X.

Aztec Network
Aztec Network
1 May
xx min read

What is the Aztec Public Testnet?

Aztec will be a fully decentralized, permissionless and privacy-preserving L2 on Ethereum. The purpose of Aztec’s Public Testnet is to test all the decentralization mechanisms needed to launch a strong and decentralized mainnet. In this post, we’ll explore what full decentralization means, how the Aztec Foundation is testing each aspect in the Public Testnet, and the challenges and limitations of testing a decentralized network in a testnet environment.

The three aspects of decentralization

Three requirements must be met to achieve decentralization for any zero-knowledge L2 network: 

  1. Decentralized sequencing: the process of using a network of nodes to sequence transactions, rather than relying on centralized authority; 
  1. Decentralized proving: generating zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) across a distributed network of computers; and 
  1. Decentralized governance: a system where decision-making authority is distributed across a network of participants. 

Decentralization across sequencing, proving, and governance is essential to ensure that no single party can control or censor the network. Decentralized sequencing guarantees open participation in block production, while decentralized proving ensures that block validation remains trustless and resilient, and finally, decentralized governance empowers the community to guide network evolution without centralized control. 

Together, these pillars secure the rollup’s autonomy and long-term trustworthiness. Let’s explore how Aztec’s Public Testnet is testing the implementation of each of these aspects. 

Decentralized sequencing

Aztec will launch with a fully decentralized sequencer network. 

This means that anyone can run a sequencer node and start sequencing transactions, proposing blocks to L1 and validating blocks built by other sequencers. The sequencer network is a proof-of-stake (PoS) network like Ethereum, but differs in an important way. Rather than broadcasting blocks to every sequencer, Aztec blocks are validated by a randomly chosen set of 48 sequencers. In order for a block to be added to the L2 chain, two-thirds of the sequencers need to verify the block. This offers users fast preconfirmations, meaning the Aztec Network can sequence transactions faster while utilizing Ethereum for final settlement security. 

PoS is fundamentally an anti-sybil mechanism—it works by giving economic weight to participation and slashing malicious actors. At the time of Aztec’s mainnet, this will allow sequencers to vote out bad actors and burn their staked assets. On the Public Testnet, where there are no real economic incentives, PoS doesn't function properly. To address this, we introduced a queue system that limits how quickly new sequencers can join, helping to maintain network health and giving the network time to react to potential malicious behavior.

Behind the scenes, a contract handles sequencer onboarding—it mints staking assets, adds sequencers to the set, and can remove them if necessary. This contract is just for Public Testnet and will be removed on Mainnet, allowing us to simulate and test the decentralized sequencing mechanisms safely.

Decentralized proving 

Aztec will also launch with a fully decentralized prover network. 

Provers generate cryptographic proofs that verify the correctness of public transactions, culminating in a single rollup proof submitted to Ethereum. Decentralized proving reduces centralization risk and liveness failures, but also opens up a marketplace to incentivize fast and efficient proof generation. The proving client developed by Aztec Labs involves three components: 

  1. Prover nodes identify unproven epochs (set of 32 blocks) and create individual proving jobs;

  2. Proving brokers add these proving job requests to a queue and allocate them to idle proving agents; and

  3. Proving agents compute the actual proofs. 

Once the final proof has been computed, the proving node sends the proof to L1 for verification. The Aztec Network splits proving rewards amongst everyone who submits a proof on time, reducing centralization risk where one entity with large compute dominates the network. 

For Aztec’s Public Testnet, anyone can spin up a prover node and start generating proofs. Running a prover node is more hardware-intensive than running a sequencer node, requiring ~40 machines with an estimated 16 cores and 128GB RAM each. Because running provers can be cost-intensive and incur the same costs on a testnet as it will on mainnet, Aztec’s Public Testnet will throttle transactions to 0.2 per second (TPS). 

Keeping transaction volumes low allows us to test a fully decentralized prover network without overwhelming participating provers with high costs before real network incentives are in place. 

Decentralized governance

Finally, Aztec will launch with fully decentralized governance. 

In order for network upgrades to occur, anyone can put forward a proposal for sequencers to consider. If a majority of sequencers signal their support, the proposal gets sent to a vote. Once it passes the vote, anyone can execute the script that will implement the upgrade. Note: For this testnet, the second phase of voting will be skipped. 

Decentralized governance is an important step in enabling anyone to participate in shaping the future of the network. The goal of the public testnet is to ensure the mechanisms are functioning properly for sequencers to permissionlessly join and control the Aztec Network from day 1. 

Client-side proofs 

One additional aspect to consider with regard to full decentralization is the role of network users in decentralizing the compute load of the network.

Aztec Labs has developed groundbreaking technology to make end-to-end programmable privacy possible. First with the release of Plonk, and later refinements like MegaHonk, which make it feasible to generate client-side ZKPs. Client-side proofs keep sensitive data on the user’s device while still enabling users to interact with and store this information privately onchain. They also help to scale throughput by pushing execution to users. This decentralizes the compute requirements and means users can execute arbitrary logic in their private functions.

Sequencers and provers on the Aztec Network are never able to see any information that users or applications want to keep private, including accounts, activity, balances, function execution, or other data of any kind. 

Aztec’s Public Testnet is shipping with a full execution environment, including the ability to create client-side proofs in the browser. Here are some time estimations to expect for generating private, client-side proofs: 

  • Client-side proofs natively on laptop: ~2.5 seconds for a basic function call (i.e, transfers);

  • Client-side proofs in browser: ~25 seconds fixed cost for basic function call, incremental calls add a few seconds; and
     
  • Client-side proofs natively on mobile: ~5 seconds.

Conclusion

Aztec’s Public Testnet is designed to rigorously test decentralization across sequencing, proving, and governance ahead of our mainnet launch. The network design ensures no single entity can control or censor activity, empowering anyone to participate in sequencing transactions, generating proofs, and proposing governance changes. 

Visit the Aztec Testnet page to start building with programmable privacy and join our community on Discord.

Aztec Network
Aztec Network
22 Apr
xx min read

History of Aztec: Pioneering Privacy in Web3

The Early Days of Aztec (2017)

When Aztec mainnet launches, it will be the first fully private and decentralized L2 on Ethereum. Getting here was a long road: when Aztec started eight years ago, the initial plan was to build an onchain financial service called CreditMint for issuing corporate debt to mid-market enterprises – obviously a distant use case from how we understand Aztec today. When co-founders Zac Williamson, Joe Andrews, Tom Pocock, and Arnaud Schenk, got started, the world of zero-knowledge proving systems and applications weren’t even in their infancy: there was no PLONK, no Noir, no programmable privacy, and it wasn’t clear that demand for onchain privacy was even strong enough to necessitate a new blockchain network. The founders’ initial explorations through CreditMint led to what we know as Aztec today. 

While putting corporate debt onchain might seem unglamorous (or just limited compared with how we now understand Aztec’s capabilities), it was useful, wildly popular, and necessary for the founding team to realized that no serious institution wanted to touch the blockchain without the same privacy assurances that they were accustomed to in the corporate world. Traditional finance is built around trusted intermediaries and middlemen, which of course introduces friction and bottlenecks progress – but offers more privacy assurances than what you see on public blockchains like Ethereum. 

This takeaway led to a bigger understanding: the number of people (not just the number of institutions) who wanted to use the blockchain was limited by a lack of programmable privacy. Aztec was born out of the recognition that everyone – not only corporations – could use permissionless, onchain systems for private transactions, and this could become the default for all online payments. In the words of the CEO, Zac Williamson:

“If you had programmable digital money that had privacy guarantees around it, you could use that to create extremely fast permissionless payment channels for payments on the internet.” 

Equipped with this understanding, Zac and Joe began to specialize. Zac, whose background is in particle physics, went deep on cryptography research and began exploring protocols that could be used to enable onchain privacy. Meanwhile, Joe worked on how to get user adoption for privacy tech, while Arnaud focused on getting the initial CreditMint platform live and recruiting early members of the team. In 2018, Aztec published a proof-of-concept transaction demonstrating the creation and transfer of private assets on Ethereum  – using an early cryptographic protocol that predated modern proving schemes like PLONK. It was a limited example, with just DAI as the test-case (and it could only facilitate private assets, not private identities), but it garnered a lot of early interest from members of the Ethereum community. 

“The Product Needs Drive the Proving Scheme” (2018-2020)

The 2018 version of the Aztec Protocol had three key limitations: it wasn’t programmable, it only supported private data (rather than private data and user-level privacy), and it was expensive, from both a computation and gas perspective. The underlying proving scheme was, in the words of Zac, a “Frankenstein cryptography protocol using older primitives than zk-SNARKs.” These limitations motivated the development of PLONK in 2019, a SNARK-based proving system that is computationally inexpensive, and only requires one universal trusted setup. 

A single universal trusted setup is desirable because it allows developers to utilize a common reference string for all of the programs they might want to instantiate in a circuit; the alternative is a much more cumbersome process of conducting a trusted setup ceremony for each cryptographic circuit. In other words, PLONK enabled programmable privacy for future versions of Aztec. 

PLONK was a big breakthrough, not just for Aztec, but for the wider blockchain community. Today, PLONK has been implemented and extended by teams like zkSync, Polygon, Mina, and more. There is even an entire category of proving systems called PLONKish that all derive from the original 2019 paper. For Aztec specifically, PLONK was also instrumental in paving the way for zk.money and Aztec Connect, a private payment network and private DeFi rollup, which launched in 2021 and 2022 respectively.  

The product needs of Aztec motivated the development of a modern-day proving system. PLONK proofs are computationally cheap to generate, leading not only to lower transaction costs and programmability for developers, but big steps forward for privacy and decentralization. PLONK made it simpler to generate client-side proofs on inexpensive hardware. In the words of Joe, “PLONK [was] developed to keep the middleman away.”  

Making the Blockchain Real (2021-2023)

Between 2021 and 2023, the Aztec team operated zk.money and Aztec Connect. The products were not only vital in illustrating that there was a demand for onchain privacy solutions, but in demonstrating that it was possible to build performant and private networks leveraging PLONK. Joe remarked that they “wanted to test that we could build a viable payments network, where the user experience was on par with a public transaction. Privacy needed to be in the background.” 

Aztec’s early products indicated that there was significant demand for private onchain payments and DeFi – at peak, the rollups had over $20 million in TVL. Both products fit into the vision Zac had to “make the blockchain real.” In his team’s eyes, blockchains are held back from mainstream adoption because you can’t bring consequential, real-world assets onchain without privacy. 

Despite the demand for these networks, the team made the decision to sunset both zk.money and Aztec Connect after recognizing that they could not fully decentralize the networks without massive architectural changes. Zac and Joe don’t believe in “Progressive Decentralization” – the network needs to have no centralized operators from day one. And it wasn’t just the sequencer of these early Aztec products that were centralized – the team also recognized that it would have been impossible for other developers to write programs on Aztec that could compose with each other, because all programs operated on shared state. In 2023, zk.money and Aztec Connect were officially shut down. 

In tandem, the team also began developing Noir (an original brainchild of Kevaundray Wedderbaum). Noir is a Rust-like programming language for writing zero-knowledge circuits that makes privacy technology accessible to mainstream developers. While Noir began as a way to make it easier for developers to write private programs without needing to know cryptography, the team soon realized that the demand for privacy didn’t just apply to applications on the Aztec stack, and that Noir could be a general-purpose DSL for any kind of application that needs to leverage privacy. In the same way that bringing consequential assets and activity onchain “makes the blockchain real,” bringing zero-knowledge technology to any application – onchain or offchain – makes privacy real. The team continued working on Noir, and it has developed into its own product stack today. 

Aztec Today 

Aztec from 2017 to 2024 can be seen as a methodical journey toward building a fully private, programmable, and decentralized blockchain network. The earliest attempt at Aztec as a protocol introduced asset-level privacy, without addressing user-level privacy, or significant programmability. PLONK paved the way for user-level privacy and programmability, which yielded zk.money and Aztec Connect. Noir extended programmability even further, making it easy for developers to build applications in zero-knowledge. But zk.money and Aztec Connect were incomplete without a viable path to decentralization. So, the team decided to build a new network from scratch. Extending on their learnings from past networks, the foundations and findings from continuous R&D efforts of PLONK, and the growing developer community around Noir, they set the stage for Aztec mainnet. 

The fact of the matter is that creating a network that is fully private and decentralized is hard. To have privacy, all data must be shielded cheaply inside of a SNARK. If you want to really embrace the idea of “making the blockchain real” then you should also be able to leverage outside authentication and identity solutions, like Apple ID – and you need to be able to put those technologies inside of a SNARK as well. The number of statements that need to be represented as provable circuits is massive. Then, all of these capabilities need to run inside of a network that is decentralized. The combination of mathematical, technological, and networking problems makes this very difficult to achieve

The technical architecture of Aztec reflects the learnings of the Aztec team. Zac describes Aztec mainnet as a “Russian nesting doll” of products that all add up to a private and decentralized network. Aztec today consists of:

  1. A decentralized Prover and Sequencer network that eliminates central points of control
  2. The Privacy Execution Environment (PXE) that enables client-side proving
  3. Significant innovations in proving systems, including the faster, low-memory proving systems optimized for browser performance

At the network level, there will be many participants in the decentralization efforts of Aztec: provers, sequencers, and node operators. Joe views the infrastructure-level decentralization as a crucial first stage of Aztec’s mainnet launch.

As Aztec goes live, the vision extends beyond private transactions to enabling entirely new categories of applications. The team envisions use cases ranging from consumer lending based on private credit scores to games leveraging information asymmetry, to social applications that preserve user privacy. The next phase will focus on building a robust ecosystem of developers and the next generation of applications on Ethereum using  Noir, the universal language of privacy. 

Aztec mainnet marks the emergence of applications that weren't possible before – applications that combine the transparency and programmability of blockchain with the privacy necessary for real-world adoption. 

Community
Community
25 Mar
xx min read

Is ZK-MPC-FHE-TEE a real creature?

Many thanks to Remi Gai, Hannes Huitula, Giacomo Corrias, Avishay Yanai, Santiago Palladino, ais, ji xueqian, Brecht Devos, Maciej Kalka, Chris Bender, Alex, Lukas Helminger, Dominik Schmid, ​​0xCrayon, Zac Williamson for inputs, discussions, and reviews. 

Contents

  1. Introduction: why we are here and why this article should exist
  2. Quick overview of each technology
    1. Client-side proving
    2. FHE
    3. MPC
    4. TEE
  3. Does it make sense to combine any of them and is it feasible?
    1. ZK-MPC
    2. MPC-FHE
    3. ZK-FHE
    4. ZK-MPC-FHE
    5. TEE-{everything}
  4. Conclusions: what to use and under what circumstances
    1. Comparison table
    2. What are the most reasonable approaches for on-chain privacy?

Prerequisites:

Introduction

Buzzwords are dangerous. They amuse and fascinate as cutting-edge, innovative, mesmerizing markers of new ideas and emerging mindsets. Even better if they are abbreviations, insider shorthand we can use to make ourselves look smarter and more progressive:

Using buzzwords can obfuscate the real scope and technical possibilities of technology. Furthermore, buzzwords might act as a gatekeeper making simple things look complex, or on the contrary, making complex things look simple (according to the Dunning-Kruger effect).

In this article, we will briefly review several suggested privacy-related abbreviations, their strong points, and their constraints. And after that, we’ll think about whether someone will benefit from combining them or not. We’ll look at different configurations and combinations.

Disclaimer: It’s not fair to compare the technologies we’re discussing since it won’t be an apples-to-apples comparison. The goal is to briefly describe each of them, highlighting their strong and weak points. Understanding this, we will be able to make some suggestions about combining these technologies in a meaningful way. 

POV: a new dev enters the space.

Quick overview of each technology

Client-side ZKPs

Client-side ZKP is a specific category of zero-knowledge proofs (started in 1989). The exploration of general ZKPs in great depth is out-of-scope for this piece. If you're curious to learn about it, check this article

Essentially, zero-knowledge protocol allows one party (prover) to prove to another party (verifier) that some given statement is true, while avoiding conveying any information beyond the mere fact of that statement's truth.

Client-side ZKPs enable generation of the proof on a user's device for the sake of privacy. A user makes some arbitrary computations and generates proof that whatever they computed was computed correctly. Then, this proof can be verified and utilized by external parties.

One of the most widely known use cases of the client-side ZKPs is a privacy preserving L2 on Ethereum where, thanks to client-side data processing, some functions and values in a smart-contract can be executed privately, while the rest are executed publicly. In this case, the client-side ZKP is generated by the user executing the transaction, then verified by the network sequencer. 

However, client-side proof generation is not limited to Ethereum L2s, nor to blockchain at all. Whenever there are two or more parties who want to compute something privately and then verify each other’s computation and utilize their results for some public protocols, client-side ZKPs will be a good fit.

Check this article for more details on how client-side ZKPs work.

The main concern today about on-chain privacy by means of client-side proof generation is the lack of a private shared state. Potentially, it can be mitigated with an MPC committee (which we will cover in later sections). 

Speaking of limitations of client-side proving, one should consider: 

  • The memory constraint: inherited from WASM memory cap – 4Gb and in case of mobile proving each device has its own memory cap as well. 
  • The maximum circuit size (derived from WASM memory cap): currently 2^20 for Aztec’s client-side proof generation (i.e. to prove any Noir program with Barretenberg in WASM).

What can we do with client-side ZKPs today: 

  • According to HashCloak benchmarking, a client-side ZKP of an RSA signature in Noir is generated in 0.2s (using UltraHonk and a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-13700H CPU and 32 GB of RAM).
  • According to Polygon Miden, a STARK ZKP for the Fibonacci calculator program for 2^20 cycles at 96-bit security level can be generated in 7 sec using Apple M1 Pro (16 threads). 
  • According to ZKPrize winners’ benchmarks, it takes 10 minutes to prove the target of 50 signatures over 100B to 1kB messages on a consumer device (Macbook pro with 32GB of memory).

Whom to follow for client-side ZKPs updates: Aztec Labs, Miden, Aleo

MPC (Multiparty computation) 

Disclaimer: in this section, we discuss general-purpose MPC (i.e. allowing computations on arbitrary functions). There are also a bunch of specialized MPC protocols optimized for various use cases (i.e. designing customized functions) but those are out-of-scope for this article.

MPC enables a set of parties to interact and compute a joint function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the output: f(input_1, input_2, …, input_n) → output.

For example, parties can be servers that hold a distributed database system and the function can be the database update. Or parties can be several people jointly managing a private key from an Ethereum account and the function can be a transaction signing mechanism. 

One issue of concern with MPCs is that one or more parties participating in the protocol can be malicious. They can try to:

  • Learn private inputs of other parties;
  • Cause the result of computations to be incorrect.

Hence in the context of MPC security, one wants to ensure that:

  • All private inputs stay private (i.e. each party knows its input and nothing else);
  • The output was computed correctly and each party received its correct output.

To think about MPC security in an exhaustive way, we should consider three perspectives:

  1. How many parties are assumed to be honest?
  2. The specific methods of corrupting parties.
  3. What can corrupted parties do?

How many parties are assumed to be honest?

Rather than requiring all parties in the computation to remain honest, MPC tolerates different levels of corruption depending on the underlying assumptions. Some models remain secure if less than 1/3 of parties are corrupt, some if less than 1/2 are corrupt, and some even have security guarantees even in the case that more than half of the parties are corrupt. For details, formal definition, and proof of MPC protocol security, check this paper.

The specific methods of corrupting parties

There are three main corruption strategies:

  1. Static – parties are corrupted before the protocol starts and remain corrupted to the end. 
  2. Adaptive – parties can be corrupted at different stages of protocol execution and after execution remain corrupted to the end. 
  3. Proactive – parties can switch between malicious and honest behavior during the protocol execution an arbitrary number of times, etc. 

Each of these assumptions will assume a different security model.

What can corrupted parties do?

Two definitions of malicious behavior are: 

  1. Semi-honest (also referred to as honest but curious, or passive adversary) – following the protocol as prescribed but trying to extract some additional information.
  2. Malicious – deviating from the protocol.

When it comes to the definition of privacy, MPC guarantees that the computation process itself doesn’t reveal any information. However, it doesn’t guarantee that the output won’t reveal any information. For an extreme example, consider two people computing the average of their salaries. While it’s true that nothing but the average will be output, when each participant knows their own salary amount and the average of both salaries, they can derive the exact salary of the other person.

That is to say, while the core “value proposition” of MPC seems to be very attractive for a wide range of real world use cases, a whole bunch of nuances should be taken into account before it will actually provide a high enough security level. (It's important to clarify the problem statement and decide whether it is the right tool for this particular task.)

What can be done with MPC protocols today:

When we think about MPC performance, we should consider the following parameters: number of participating parties, witness size of each party, and function complexity. 

  • According to the “Efficient Arithmetic in Garbled Circuits” paper, for general-purpose MPC, the computation costs are the following: at most O(n · ℓ · λ) bits per gate, with each multiplication gate using O(ℓ · λ) bits where  ℓ is the bit length of values, λ is a computational security parameter, and n is the number of gates. A value can be translated from arithmetic to Boolean (and vice versa) at cost O(ℓ · λ) bits (e.g. to perform comparison operation).

Source

  • As a matter of illustration, we are also providing an example of a specialized MPC protocol:
    According to dWallet Labs, their implementation of 2PC-MPC protocol (2-party ECDSA protocol) completes the signing phase in 1.23 and 12.703 seconds, for 256 and 1024 parties (emulating the second party in 2PC), respectively (claiming the number of parties can be scaled further).
  • Worldcoin jointly with TACEO made a number of optimizations to existing Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) protocol, that enabled them to apply SMPC to the problem of iris code uniqueness. Early benchmarks show that one can achieve 10 iris uniqueness checks per second in ~6M database.

When it comes to using MPC in blockchain context, it’s important to consider message complexity, computational complexity, and such properties as public verifiability and abort identifiability (i.e. if a malicious party causes the protocol to prematurely halt, then they can be detected). For message distribution, the protocol relies either on P2P channels between each two parties (requires a large bandwidth) or broadcasting. Another concern arises around the permissionless nature of blockchain since MPC protocols often operate over permissioned sets of nodes.

Taking into account all that, it’s clear that MPC is a very nuanced technology on its own. And it becomes even more nuanced when combined with other technologies. Adding MPC to a specific blockchain protocol often requires designing a custom MPC protocol that will fit. And that design process often requires a room full of MPC PhDs who can not only design but also prove its security.

Whom to follow for MPC updates: dWallet Labs, TACEO, Fireblocks, Cursive, PSE, Fairblock, Soda Labs, Silence Laboratories, Nillion

TEE

TEE stands for Trusted Execution Environment. TEE is an area on the main processor of a device that is separated from the system's main operating system (OS). It ensures data is stored, processed, and protected in a separate environment. One of the most widely known units of TEE (and one we often mention when discussing blockchain) is Software Guard Extensions (SGX) made by Intel. 

SGX can be considered a type of private execution. For example, if a smart contract is run inside SGX, it’s executed privately. 

SGX creates a non-addressable memory region of code and data (separated from RAM), and encrypts both at a hardware level. 

How SGX works:

  • There are two areas in the hardware, trusted and untrusted. 
  • The application creates an enclave in the trusted area and makes a call to the trusted function. (The function is a piece of code developed for working inside the enclave.) Only trusted functions are allowed to run in the enclave. All other attempts to access the enclave memory from outside the enclave are denied by the processor.
  • Once the function is called, the application is running in the trusted space and sees the enclave code and data as clear text.
  • When the trusted function returns, the enclave data remains in the trusted memory area.

It’s worth noting that there is a key pair: a secret key and a public key. The secret key is generated inside of the enclave and never leaves it. The public key is available to anyone: Users can encrypt a message using a public key so only the enclave can decrypt it.

An SGX feature often utilized in the blockchain context is attestations. Attestation is the process of demonstrating that a software executable has been properly instantiated on a platform. Remote Attestation allows a remote party to be confident that the intended software is securely running within an enclave on a fully patched, Intel SGX-enabled platform.

Core SGX concerns:

  • SGX is subject to side-channel attacks. Observing a program’s indirect effects on the system during execution might leak information if a program’s runtime behavior is correlated with the secret input content that it operates on. Different attack vectors include page access patterns, timing behavior, power usage, etc.
  • Using SGX requires trusting Intel. Users must assume that everything is fine since the hardware is delivered with the private key already inside the trusted enclave. 
  • As a large enterprise, Intel is pretty slow in terms of patching new attacks. Check sgx.fail to find a list of publicly known SGX attacks that are yet to be fixed by Intel.
  • Application developers who use SGX are dependent on specific hardware produced by Intel. The company might eventually decide to deprecate or significantly change all or specific versions in ways that might make some or all applications incompatible. Or even break them. For example in 2021, SGX was deprecated on consumer CPUs. 
  • It might be hard to detect cheating fast enough if it takes place in a private domain (like with SGX). 
  • In the case of a network relying purely on TEE for privacy (i.e. a number of nodes run inside TEE and each node has complete information), exploiting one node in the network is enough to exploit the whole network (i.e. leak secrets).

Speaking of SGX cost, the proof generation cost can be considered free of charge. Though if one wants to use remote attestations, the initial one-time cost (once per SGX prover) for it is in the order of 1M gas (to make sure the code in SGX is running in the expected way).

Onchain verification cost equals to verifying an ECDSA signature (~5k gas while for ZK signature verification will cost ~300k gas). 

When it comes to execution time, there is effectively no overhead. For example, for proving a zk-rollup block, it will be around 100ms.

Where SGX is utilized in blockchain today:

  • Taiko is running an execution client inside the SGX (utilizing TEE for integrity). 
  • Secret Network’s validators run their code inside a TEE (utilizing TEE for privacy).
  • Flashbots are running SUAVE testnet on SGX.

Whom to follow for TEE updates: Secret Network, Flashbots, Andrew Miller, Oasis, Phala, Marlin, Automata, TEN.

FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryption)

FHE enables encrypted data processing (i.e. computation on encrypted data). 

The idea of FHE was proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos. “Fully” means that both addition and multiplication can be performed on encrypted data. Let m be some plain text and E(m) be an encrypted text (ciphertext). Then additive homomorphism is E(m_1 + m_2) = E(m_1) + E(m_2) and multiplicative homomorphism is E(m_1 * m_2) = E(m_1) * E(m_2). 

Additive Homomorphic Encryption was used for a while, but Multiplicative Homomorphic Encryption was still an issue. In 2009, Craig Gentry came up with the idea to use ideal lattices to tackle this problem. That made it possible to do both addition and multiplication, although it also made growing noise an issue. 

How FHE works:

Plain text is encoded into ciphertext. Ciphertext consists of encrypted data and some noise. 

That means when computations are done on ciphertext, they are done not purely on data but on data together with added noise. With each performed operation, the noise increases. After several operations, it starts overflowing on the bits of actual data, which might lead to incorrect results.

A number of tricks were proposed later on to handle the noise and make the FHE work more reliably. One of the most well-known tricks was bootstrapping, a special operation that reset the noise to its nominal level. However, bootstrapping is slow and costly (both in terms of memory consumption and computational cost). 

Researchers rolled out even more workarounds to make bootstrapping efficient and took FHE several more steps forward. Further details are out-of-scope for this article, but if you’re interested in FHE history, check out this talk by mathematician Zvika Brakerski. 

Core FHE concerns:

  • If the user (who encrypts information) outsources computations to an external party, they have to trust that the computations were done correctly.
    To handle the trust issue, (i) theoretically ZK can be used (though practically it’s not feasible today), (ii) economic consensus can be used. However, as FHE requires custom hardware (as computations to be done are very heavy), the number of participants in the FHE consensus network will always be limited, which is a problem for security. 
  • In the case of the FHE blockchain, there is one key for the whole network. Who holds the decryption key? The same will apply to dApps. For example, if an FHE computation modifies a liquidity pool total supply, that “total supply” must be decrypted at some point. But who possesses the key? (If you’re curious about FHE key attacks, check out this paper by Li and Micciancio).
  • If an external party provides encrypted input, how can the party performing computations be sure that the external party knows the input and that the input was encrypted correctly? (This can be mitigated with zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, which will be discussed in the ZK-FHE section).
  • While using FHE, one should ensure that the decrypted output doesn’t contain any private information that should not be revealed. Otherwise, formally it breaks privacy.
    One should note that there are two different types of decryption: (i) to reveal the entire network (e.g. reveal cards at the end of the game), (ii) reencryption (i.e. decryption and encryption) as a view function (e.g. view your own cards). 
  • FHE is “heavy.” When considering FHE computation cost (both in terms of computation volume and memory required), related considerations include (i) operations computation cost, (ii) communication cost, and (iii) evaluation keys size (a separate public key that is used to control the noise growth or the ciphertext expansion during homomorphic evaluation).
    One might think about FHE hardware similar to Bitcoin hardware (highly performant ASICs).


Compared to computations on plain text, the best per-operation overhead available today is polylogarithmic [GHS12b] where if n is the input size, by polylogarithmic we mean O(log^k(n)), k is a constant. For communication overhead, it’s reasonable if doing batching and unbatching of a number of ciphertexts but not reasonable otherwise. 

For evaluation keys, key size is huge (larger than ciphertexts that are large as well). The evaluation key size is around 160,000,000 bits. Furthermore, one needs to permanently compute on these keys. Whenever homomorphic evaluation is done, you’ll need to access the evaluation key, bring it into the CPU (a regular data bus in a regular processor will be unable to bring it), and make computations on it. 


If you want to do something beyond addition and multiplication—a branch operation, for example—you have to break down this operation into a sequence of additions and multiplications. That’s pretty expensive. Imagine you have an encrypted database and an encrypted data chunk, and you want to insert this chunk into a specific position in the database. If you’re representing this operation as a circuit, the circuit will be as large as the whole database.


In the future, FHE performance is expected to be optimized both on the FHE side (new tricks discovered) and hardware side (acceleration and ASIC design). This promises to allow for more complex smart contract logics as well as more computation-intensive use cases such as AI/ML. A number of companies are working on designing and building FHE-specific FPGAs (e.g. Belfort).

“Misuse of FHE can lead to security faults.”

Source

What can be done with FHE today: 

  • According to Ingonyama: With an LLM like GPT2, processing time for a single token is approximately 14.5 hours.
    Token is a unit of text, for example, one english word ≈ 1.3 tokens. Each text request to GPT2 consists of a number of tokens. Based on the processing time of one token, one can define the processing time of the whole request.
    With parallel processing, deploying 10,000 machines, the time is 5 seconds/token. With a custom ASIC designed, the time can be decreased to 0.1 second/token, but this would require huge initial investments in data centers and ASIC design.
  • According to Zvika Brakerski: When asked the question “Can we build production-level systems where FHE brings value?” he responds, “I don’t know the answer yet.”
  • According to Zama: A toy-implementation of Shazam (a music recognition app) with Zama FHE library takes 300 milliseconds to recognize a single song out of 1,000. But how will that change as the database grows? (The real Shazam library has 45M songs.)
  • According to Inco, FHE is usable today for simple blockchain use cases (i.e. smart contracts with simple logics). For example, in a confidential ERC-20 transfer that’s FHE-based, you are performing an FHE addition, subtraction, comparison, and conditional multiplexer (cmux/select) to update the balances of the sender and recipient. With CPU, Inco can do 10 TPS, and with GPU – 20-30 TPS. 

Note: In all of these examples, we are talking about plain FHE, without any MPC or ZK superstructures handling the core FHE issues.

Whom to follow for FHE updates: Zama, Sunscreen, Zvika Brakerski, Inco, FHE Onchain.

Does it make sense to combine any of these, and is doing so feasible?

As we can see from the technology overview, these technologies are not exactly interchangeable. That said, they can complement each other. Now let’s think. Which ones should be combined, and for what reason?

Disclaimer: Each of the technologies we are talking about is pretty complex on its own. The combinations of them we discuss below are, to a large extent, theoretical and hypothetical. However, there are a number of teams working on combining them at the time of writing (both research and implementation). 

ZK-MPC

In this section, we mostly describe two papers as examples and don’t claim to be exhaustive. 

One of the possible applications of ZK-MPC is a collaborative zk-snark. This would allow users to jointly generate a proof over the witnesses of multiple, mutually distrusting parties. The proof generation algorithm is run as an MPC among N provers where function f is the circuit representation of a zk-SNARK proof generator. 

Source

Collaborative zk-SNARKs also offer an efficient construction for a cryptographic primitive called a publicly auditable MPC (PA-MPC). This is an MPC that also produces a proof the public can use to verify that the computation was performed correctly with respect to commitments to the inputs.

ZK-MPC introduces the notion of MPC-friendly zk-SNARKs. That is to say, not just any MPC protocol or any zk-SNARK can feasibly be combined into ZK-MPC. This is because MPC protocols and zk-SNARK provers are each thousands of times slower than their underlying functionality, and their combination is likely to be millions of times slower.

For those familiar with elliptic curve cryptography, let’s think for a moment about why is ZK-MPC tricky:

If doing it naively, you could decompose an elliptic curve operation into operations over the curve’s base field; then there is an obvious way to perform them in an MPC. But curve additions require tens of field operations, and scalar products require thousands. 

The core tricks suggested for use include: 

  • MPC techniques applied directly to elliptic curves to make curve operations cheap.
  • The N shares are themselves elliptic curve points, and the secret is reconstructed by a weighted linear combination of a sufficient number of shares.
  • An optimized MPC protocol is utilized for computing sequences of partial products. 

Essentially, ZK-MPC in general and collaborative zk-SNARKs in particular are not just about combining ZK and MPC. Getting these two technologies to work in concert is complex and requires a huge chunk of research. 

According to one of the papers on this topic, for collaborative zk-SNARKs, over a 3Gb/s link, security against a malicious minority of provers can be achieved with approximately the same runtime as a single prover. Security against N−1 malicious provers requires only a 2x slowdown. Both TACEO and Renegade (launched mainnet on 04.09.24) teams are currently working on implementing this paper.

Another application of ZK-MPC is delegated zk-SNARKs. This enables a prover (called a delegator) to outsource proof generation to a set of workers for the sake of efficiency and engaging less powerful machines. This means that if at least one worker does not collude with other workers, no private information will be revealed to any worker. 

This approach introduces a custom MPC protocol. The issues with using existing protocols are:

  • Existing state-of-the-art MPC protocols achieving malicious security against a dishonest majority of workers rely on relatively heavyweight public-key cryptography, which has a non-trivial computational overhead. 
  • These MPC protocols require expressing the computation as an arithmetic circuit, including expressing complex operations such as elliptic curve multi-scalar multiplications and polynomial arithmetic that is expensive.

One of the papers on this topic suggests using SPDZ as a starting point and modifying it. A naive approach would be to use the zk-SNARK to succinctly check that the MPC execution is correct by having the delegator verify the zk-SNARK produced by the workers. However, this wouldn’t be knowledge-sound because the adversary can attempt to malleate its shares of the delegator’s valid witness (w) to produce a proof of a related statement. Even if the resulting proof is invalid, it can leak information about w. However, we can use the succinct verification properties of the underlying components of the zk-SNARK, the PIOP (Polynomial Interactive Oracle Proof) and the PC (Polynomial Commitment) scheme.

Other modifications correspond to optimizations, such as optimizing the number of multiplications in, and the multiplicative depth of circuits for these operations; and introducing a consistency checker for the PIOP to enable the delegator to efficiently check that the polynomials computed during the MPC execution are consistent with those that an honest prover would have computed.

According to one of the papers on this topic, “... when compared to local proving, using our protocols to delegate proof generation from a recent smartphone (a) reduces end-to-end latency by up to 26x, (b) lowers the delegator’s active computation time by up to 1447x, and (c) enables proving up to 256x larger instances.”

For a privacy-preserving blockchain, ZK-MPC can be utilized for collaboratively proving the correctness of state transition, where each party participating in generating proof has only a part of the witness. Hence the proof can be generated while no single party is aware of what they are proving. For this purpose, there should be an on-chain committee that will generate collaborative zk-SNARKs. It’s worth noting that even though we are using the term “committee,” this is still a purely cryptographic solution. 

Whom to follow for ZK-MPC updates: TACEO, Renegade.

MPC-FHE

There are a number of ways to combine FHE and MPC and each serves a different goal. For example, MPC-FHE can be employed to tackle the issue “Who holds the decryption key?” This is relevant for an FHE network or an FHE DEX. 

One approach is to have several parties jointly generate a global single FHE key. Another approach is multi-key FHE: the parties take their existing individual (multiple) FHE key pairs and combine them in order to perform an MPC-like computation. 

As a concrete example, for an FHE network, the state decryption key can be distributed to multiple parties, with each party receiving one piece. While decrypting the state, each party does a partial decryption. The partial decryptions are aggregated to yield the full decrypted value. The security of this approach holds under an assumption of 2/3 honest validators. 

The next question is, “How should other network participants (e.g. network nodes) access the decrypted data?” It can’t be done using a regular oracle (i.e. each node in the oracle consensus network must obtain the same result given the same input) since that would break privacy. 

One possible solution is a two-round consensus mechanism (though this relies on social consensus, not pure cryptography). The first round is the consensus on what should be decrypted. That is, the oracle waits until most validators send it the same request for decryption. Next, the round of decryption. Then, the validators update the chain state and append the block to the blockchain. 

Whom to follow for MPC-FHE updates: Gauss Labs (utilized by Cursive team).

ZK-FHE

MPC-FHE has two issues that can potentially be mitigated with ZK:

  1. Were inputs encrypted correctly?
  2. Were the computations on encrypted data performed correctly?

Without introducing ZK, both issues listed above make one fragment of private computations unverifiable. (That doesn’t quite work for most blockchain use cases). 

Where are we today with ZK-FHE?

According to Zama, proof of one correct bootstrapping operation can be generated in 21 minutes on a huge AWS machine (c6i.metal). And that’s pretty much it. Hopefully, in the upcoming years we will see more research on ZK-FHE.

Whom to follow for ZK-FHE updates: Zama, Pado Labs.

ZK-MPC-FHE (a sum of MPC-FHE and ZK-FHE)

One issue with MPC-FHE we haven’t mentioned so far has to do with knowing for sure that an encrypted piece of information supplied by a specific party was encrypted by that same party. What if party A took a piece of information encrypted by party B and supplied it as its own input? 

To handle this issue, each party can generate a ZKP that they know the plaintext they are sending in an encrypted way. Adding this ZK tweak with two ZK tweaks from the previous section (ZK-FHE), we will get verifiable privacy with ZK-MPC-FHE.

Whom to follow for ZK-MPC-FHE updates: Pado Labs, Greco.

TEE-{everything}

TL;DR: In general, when it comes to using any new technology, it makes sense to run it inside TEE since the attack vector with TEE is orders of magnitude smaller than on a regular computer:

Source

Using TEE as an execution environment (to construct ZK proofs and participate in MPC and FHE protocols) improves security at almost zero cost. In this case, secrets stay in TEE only within active computation and then they are discarded. However, using TEE for storing secrets is a bad idea. Trusting TEEs for a month is bad, trusting TEEs for 30 seconds is probably fine. 

Another approach is to use TEE as a “training wheels,” for example, for multi-prover where computations are run both in a ZK circuit and TEE, and to be considered valid they should agree on the same result. 

Whom to follow for TEE-{something} updates: Safeheron (TEE-MPC).

Conclusions: should we combine them all?

It might feel tempting to take all of the technologies we’ve mentioned and craft a zk-mpc-fhe-tee machine that will combine all their strengths:

However, the mere fact that we can combine technologies doesn’t mean we should combine them. We can combine ZK-MPC-FHE-TEE and then add quantum computers, restaking, and AI gummy bears on top. But for what reason? 

Source

Each of these technologies adds its own overhead to the initial computations. 10 years ago, the blockchain, ZK, and FHE communities were mostly interested in proof of concept. But today, when it comes to blockchain applications, we are mostly interested in performance. That is to say we are curious to know if we combine a row of fancy technologies, what product/application could we build on it?

Let’s structure everything we discussed in a table:

Hence, if we are thinking about a privacy stack that will be expressive enough that developers can build any Web3 dApps they imagine, from everything we’ve mentioned in the article, we either have MPC-ZK (MPC is utilized for shared state) or ZK-MPC-FHE. As for today, client-side zero-knowledge proof generation is a proven concept and we are currently at the production stage. The same relates to ZK-MPC; a number of teams are working on its practical implementation. 

At the same time, ZK-MPC-FHE is still at the research and proof-of-concept stage because when it comes to imposing zero-knowledge, it’s know how to zk-prove one bootstrapping operation but not arbitrary computations (i.e. circuit of arbitrary size). Without ZK, we lose the verifiability property necessary for blockchain. 

Sources:

  • A paper, “Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)” by Yehuda Lindell.
  • An article, “Introduction to FHE: What is FHE, how does FHE work, how is it connected to ZK and MPC, what are the FHE use cases in and outside of the blockchain, etc.”
  • A talk, “Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for Blockchain Applications” by Ari Juels.
  • An article, “Why multi-prover matters. SGX as a possible solution.” 
  • A paper, “Experimenting with Collaborative zk-SNARKs: Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Distributed Secrets” by Alex Ozdemir and Dan Boneh.
  • A paper, “EOS: Efficient Private Delegation of zkSNARK Provers” by Alessandro Chiesa, Ryan Lehmkuhl, Pratyush Mishra, and Yinuo Zhang.
  • A paper, “Practical MPC+FHE with Applications in Secure Multi-Party Neural Network Evaluation” by Ruiyu Zhu,  Changchang Ding, and Yan Huang.
  • An article, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Interpolating between MPC and FHE”
  • A talk, “Building Verifiable FHE using ZK with Zama.”
  • An article, “Client-side Proof Generation.”
  • An article, “Does zero-knowledge provide privacy?”